Introduction
The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan disintegrated into a failed invasion of a third world country by a superpower after ten years of their presence in the region between 1979 and 1989.[1] Coming at a time of the cold war, the Soviet intervention in the country resulted in the death of thousands of both Afghan and Soviet soldiers, with estimates putting the total number of lives lost at 1.5 million. This is beside the huge number of Afghan nationals who fled the country, escaping what had transformed into a full-fledged uprising against the communist government by the devout Islamists; later called the Mujahedeen. The Soviet had intervened in the war as a show of solidarity with the communist Afghan regime against anticommunist Muslim revolutionaries. At the onset of the war, which had previously been an internal conflict, the Soviet’s role had been advisory, later graduating into a full-fledged support for the communist government by the Soviet by sending troops (the 40th army). The 40th Army later referred to as the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (LCSFA), at first, offered humanitarian aid to the women and children in education, as well as accompanying the doctors and delivering food, fuel and clothing.[2] Initially the Soviet’s goal was to establish a left-leaning state. The previous government headed by Mohammad Daud had been toppled due to its Western-leaning policies. The new government, under the leadership of Nur Mohammad Taraki, on the other hand, had leftist policies, which it tried to impose on the Islamic nationals. It, however, faced objection from Islamist extremist who wanted the establishment of an Islamic state founded on Sharia law. The insurrections and the internal toppling within the Afghani government were perhaps the triggers for the Soviet intervention in the country by sending its first batch of 30,000 troops into the war-torn country. It was the intention of the Soviets to establish a communist regime.[3] However, with support from the US, the mujahideen insurrection grew stronger. Propped by weapons supplied indirectly by the US and in-depth knowledge of the mountain and the rough terrains in Afghanistan, the mujahideen increasingly frustrated the Soviet’s efforts to establish a communist state. With a declining economy, increasing military and diplomatic cost as well as a new leader, the Soviet Union eventually began the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, in what was evidently a failed intervention.
In the analysis of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, this paper will have a topical structure. These will include the background of the war, the Soviet operational art in the war and its operational level. Additionally, it will also look at some of the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and how the decision was reached. Further, the paper will look at the strategic and political objectives of the war, with an in depth discussion of the principal participants in the war. The paper will then look at the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet planning in the war in addition to the impact of the Soviet Doctrine in the war. The paper will also analyze the impact of the war doctrine on the Soviet operation art in the war and perform an operational assessment of the Soviet’s in the war, conclusively drawing lessons from both the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan.
War Background
Before the outbreak of the war, Afghanistan and the Soviet had good diplomatic ties, especially with the formation of the left-leaning Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the wake of the Saur Revolution. At this time, the Soviet Union was a superpower with a strong hold over Central Asia.[4] Being in the middle of US-backed Pakistan and Soviet-backed India, Afghanistan naturally turned into a buffer state of the warring superpowers. [5] The state of affairs during the cold war period was such that the two superpowers (US and Russia) were constantly in competition, especially in the Third World to establish their influence and presence, as a means of gaining a strategic advantage over the other. Specifically, “Points of conflict increasingly centered upon influence and control over these peripheral areas, with the two superpowers striving to establish economic and political hegemonies and preventing their rival from gaining a similar position in the Third World.”[6] The result of the constant warring was the transformation of the buffer countries into battlefields and warzones from internal wrangles.
Daud Khan came into power in 1953, and seeing the competition between the superpowers and the buffer status of Afghanistan, capitalized on the state of fairs by pursuing funding from the two superpowers. Under his pursuit, the US provide economic aid while the Soviet Union supplied him with military equipment and arsenal, established a military training program for Afghanis in Russia and sent advisors for military academics in Afghanistan military camps.[7] At the time of these developments, Afghanistan was irrelevant to the US. The intensification of the Cold War, however, saw an increase in aid by the US for fears of Afghanistan becoming a Soviet sphere.[8][9]
There were marked imbalances in the funding by the two superpowers into the country; wherein the two superpowers continued more funding as a means of establishing their influence on the turbulent nation.[10] The continued funding helped in the establishment and expansion of the state apparatus, which was exclusively unaccountable to the citizenry, given that the citizens were not expected to pay any taxes.[11] Other sources joined in the foray including West Germany and France, providing education and training for the expanding Afghan bureaucracy. Al-Azhar University in Egypt, on the other hand, provided radical Islamic training on Islamic law to apart of the burgeoning state machinery.
The amplified funding and military training shifted power from the interior areas and tribal leaders to the capital. The state had therefore become effectively powerful enough to crush any tribal insurrection from the rural folk. To mark this power, Daud, began experimentation with democracy, allowing the formation of political parties. These parties had membership in the capital, with members drawn from the elite from state-funded schools.[12] Such a turn aroused disenchantment from other elite, who questioned the legitimacy of the state.
With funding fast dwindling and the economy declining, the state fell into political discontent, particularly from the elite. Worsening the situation was the major dearth and famine that hit the north of the country. This triggered protests from students, even as about five governments failed within ten years.[13] Daud, who had by then relinquished his position as the nation’s premier, toppled the monarchy with the help of a leftist party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).[14] By the end of 1978, Daud had been ousted and killed by Marxist trained soldiers and members of the PDPA, and consequently establishing the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.[15]
In-party wrangles erupted in PDPA after clinching power, leading to the assassination of almost half of the party members. This gravely affected the capability of the party to steer the government. Khalqis, a leftist extremist faction of PDPA, emerged victorious from the in-party squabbles and began a purge of any potential rivals.[16] The outcome was the elimination of a huge number of the top military personnel. After this, the Khalqis embarked on reforms that included widespread education and transfer of ownership of land to the peasantry. This plan, however, failed to consider the implications of the land reforms to the peasants who inhabited the interior parts of the country, while Islamist extremist viewed the widespread education reforms as a means of imposing atheistic ideals to the Islamic society.[17] The mass assassination of top military personnel sent a wrong message to the public; the fact that PDPA could not tolerate any opposition. Given the Khalqis close relation with the Soviet; they (the incumbent government) summarily dismissed the Soviet’s advice of the dangers in zealous reforms.[18] Traditionally, Afghan armed clans were anti-authoritarian; the government forces brutality and atrocities could thus do nothing but arouse a dissident reaction from the armed clans. The government’s actions in savagery and ham-feisty eventually instigated the nation-wide rebellion that started in 1979 and shortly after the Soviet’s invasion of the country to establish a more viable regime.[19]
Soviet Operational Art
The main intention of the Soviet was to establish a reliable communist government in Afghanistan and leave within a few months of the invasion and using the least cost.[20] This was in line with their operational art that dictated the use of conventional weapons within the 5-6 day window before the deployment of nuclear weapons, given that the 70s was a period of increased tension on use of nuclear weapons. Under such an operational art, it was the intention of the Soviets to arrest the situation in Afghanistan as fast as possible before the thought of using the weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union’s first intervention force consisted of 75,000 troops. Towards the end of the war, the LCSFA had grown to about 120,000 troops, with an additional 10,000 KGB officials, as well as the Internal Ministry officials.[21] The Soviet soldiers and air force units in Central Asia also took part in the invasion, alongside KGB Border Guards securing the Soviet-Afghan border.
The initial Soviet armies sent to Afghanistan were largely Central Asia reservists.[22] These, nevertheless, proved ineffective and unreliable and necessitated sending Russian and Slavic troops to the war-torn country. Moreover, given that a large percentage of the 40th Army was responsible for the defense of Soviet bases in Afghanistan as well as the defense of the cities, the Army was short of personnel, necessitating the additional forces against the mujahideen.[23]
In fighting the war, LCSFA planned and effected combined-arms operations for executing large-scale missions. [24] The Russian forces subdivide the operations into independent and combined operation, largely dependent on the country of origin of its troops. After the subdivisions, the army would expend part or the entire military forces and resources on the operations.[25] There were widespread independent operations, with the army leadership planning and directing these independent operations. The 40th Army conducted 220 independent operations during their stay in Afghanistan, mostly in the second phase of the war when more troops arrived from Russia.
The third and fourth phases of the war saw an increased number of combined operations. The plans for the execution of the joint operations were a reserve of the Soviet command. The Afghan and Soviet forced then executed the operations as advanced by the Soviet command; about 400 joint operations were executed during the entire period of the Soviet stay in the country.[26] The scale, location, nature of enemy actions, the approved plan of the forces annihilation and particularities of the topography determined the forces’ composition and resources for specific operations. The planners had discovered that guerrillas in the mountains required much more resources and troops, than fighting under ideal situations and, therefore, the deployment of about five combined troops for counter-guerrilla operations.[27]
Operational Level
At the operational level, the Soviet forces had five sub-divisions. These include “a first echelon, a combined-arms reserve, artillery groups, special forces, and rear services elements. The air echelon was an independent element of 20 Soviet and Afghan battalions.”[28] There was additional operational planning, which paid attention to the involvement of the combined forces. The operational plans were a reserve of a restricted number of officers, mostly drawn from the 40th Army.
The operational level also included a high level of secrecy with disinformation to both the enemy and Afghan troops. The secret plans drafted by the 40th Army officers were sealed and sent to division and regimental commanders, mostly a few days before any offensive.[29]This created hurdles in the execution of the plans, mostly because the Afghan soldiers and their command were in the dark. When brought forward, the plans were shared in compressed time, with the eventual effect of the plan being limited.[30]
Why did the Soviets invade Afghanistan?
As the Cold War intensified and the need for the extension of their hegemony in the competition with the US, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to ensure the survival of the PDPA government.[31] The invasion of Afghanistan was also as a matter of ensuring a continued presence of the Soviets in the country and furthering the establishment of a communist regime. Moreover, Amin, the then Afghan president, had instituted several reforms that the Soviet felt should be laude. By introducing democracy and giving land to the peasants, the Soviet saw these reforms as a good march towards universal communism in Afghanistan. It was therefore a matter of extending communist and Soviet hegemony to an agreeable country. At the rise of Taraki after Amin’s ouster, the Soviet felt the need to tame Taraki, who was imposing communism on Islamists. These Islamists were against Taraki’s level of communism imposition on them, and had therefore begun a revolt. It was the Soviet’s desire, therefore, to limit Taraki’s communism, while at the same time ensure a balance between the left-leaning and communist ideologies as fronted by Taraki.
Daud, as the prime minister, had ripped the US and the Soviet, receiving funding from both superpowers, but with limited tangible reforms that pleased any of the two superpowers. His murder and the rise of east-leaning PDPA, therefore, prompted the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan.[32] Along with Daud’s murder was the assassination of the Soviet advisors to the Afghan leader in Herat in March of 1979. The absence of the Soviet presence within the highest political decision-making organ of Afghanistan thus bothered the Soviet. It was therefore necessary to find not only the underlying cause of the Soviet murders, but also to support a pro-Soviet government at the helm of the country. The idea, therefore, was to protect the Soviet’s interests in the country, especially with the uprisings.
Prior to their invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet had interests in Iran. However, the US beat them to Iran, with the Western superpower developing close relations with the Islamist dictator in Iran.[33] The Soviet, therefore, feared another loss similar to that they had experienced in Iran. It was thus important that they establish their foothold in Afghanistan, preventing any purported US interests in Afghanistan.
The Decision to Invade Afghanistan
The situation was fast deteriorating in Afghanistan, and the taking over of power by the PDPA presented an opportunity for the Soviet to further its cause. In deciding to invade, “Soviet forces were committedinto Afghanistan on the false presumption that the rapidly destabilizing situation could be put right using a quick, violent coup-de-main on the model of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.”[34] Evidently, the Soviet leaders expected a short-lived and inexpensive affair in Afghanistan. It was the assumption of the leaders that the insurgents posed little threat, and they (the Soviet) could quash it with little challenge.[35]
Moreover, it is this assumption that led to the decision to use only a limited amount of Soviet troops at the start of the Afghan conflict. However, with increasing propaganda against the Soviets, which spread to townships and settlements, the Soviets had to rethink their strategy and decision on a limited military presence in Afghanistan. Besides, the propaganda had also affected the composition of the military to an extent that only Soviet Afghans seemed to be working for PDPA.[36] While the initial involvement of the Soviet troops was on a limited, pacification account, the major protest in Kabul on 20th February 1979 and the opposition attack on the Soviet embassy in Kabul prompted the decision to not only conduct joint operations with the Afghan soldiers, but also to bring in more troops to repulse and “liquidate” the guerillas.[37]
In the political front, the Soviets were entirely reluctant of sending its troops to Afghanistan. Even on Amin and Taraki’s request (Afghan prime minister and president respectively), the Soviets only responded by supplying the Afghan government with military equipment. Amin’s ouster by Taraki, however, prompted the quick decision to send troops to Afghanistan. The fear of Taraki seeking the US help fueled the decision to send the troops. Sending of the troops was the doing of a few Politburo members, who went against military counsel advising against the deployment of the troops to Afghanistan. The Soviet General Chief of Staff and his deputy had express strong objection against any military intervention in the turbulent country (Afghanistan). It was only later however, that the Politburo gave a nod to the invasion. Therefore, while the order and decision was ideally supposed to come from Marshal Ogarkov, the Chief of General Staff, the Defense ministry under Ustinov was powerful, and thus forced the decision to both the military and the Politburo.[38]
Strategic and Political Objectives
As aforementioned, the initial assumption of the Soviet government was that the uprising would be short-lived and that the Soviet involvement would be limited in both duration and scale. The objective at the onset of the invasion was, therefore, to augment the PDPA regime and its soldiers, both in material and in moral support.[39] Consequently, apart from helping to establish a communist government that had a balance of communism and considerable civil liberties, the objective was to reinforce PDPA forces’ efforts to weed out the mujahideen, and eventually have the 40th Army’s withdrawal. At the end of it all, the Soviet wanted an Afghan government that was not ‘too left-leaning’ or ‘too communist,’ but one with a balance of Marxist and Leninist ideologies.
Given the Soviet’s popularity in Central Asia, Afghanistan provided them with a rare opportunity to further their hegemony, as part of the Cold War politics. Afghanistan, playing a buffer between Communist India and West-leaning Pakistan, was strategic in its placement in the quest for continual of communism. Even more is the fact that Afghanistan, with a left-leaning government, offered an opportunity for the Soviets to advance the Brezhnev Doctrine of their right to intervene in the event of turbulence in any of their communist clients.[40]
With its large land mass, the Soviet had a problem with access to the warm waters for trade. Afghanistan, being a friendly nation, offered the Soviets a safe passage in its march to the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Afghanistan was at a strategic juncture between the Middle East and the rest of Asia and provided a strategic partner in countering the US-Pakistan alliance. [41] The strategic placement of Afghanistan additionally prompted the Soviet’s intervention in the domestic insurrection, as an alliance with the warring country had trade potential and opportunities with Asia, as well as gave the Soviets access to the Gulf oil.
Principal Participants
After the ouster of Daud, PDPA rose to power with the Khalqis at its helm. The Khalqis purging of the top military personnel created discontent within the party itself and among the tribal factions of Afghanistan. The tribal factions were specifically opposed to the left-leaning policies of the incumbent government, as well as the assassination of the top military personnel. Widespread protests rocked the cities, prompting the insurrection against PDPA and its government forces. At the onset of the war, therefore, PDPA and its forces battled from within, as well as tried to stop the tribal factions against the state of affairs.[42]
The deteriorating situation in the nation threatened the Soviet interests, prompting them to join in on the conflict, at least as an intervening party. The DRA forces, therefore, began joint operations with the Soviet army against the insurgents. Among the rebels were Islamist extremists who did not like the way the government was handling affairs. In collaboration from other Islamist refugees in Pakistan, these insurgents fled to the mountains and formed the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen wanted a country founded on Islamic laws and not the pagan democratic principles paraded by the PDPA.[43] Through the CIA, the US began a covert weapons program to fund the resistance.[44] In the end, the war had clear-cut participants; on the one side were the DRA forces with the LCSFA assistance, while on the other side were Sunni and Shia Mujahedeen, with covert weapons supplies from the US.
Strengths and Weaknesses in the Planning
During the first instances of the war, the Soviet mostly supplied the DRA forces with intelligence and armaments. This was smart as the DRA forces had far-reaching knowledge of the area and the topography in which the war progressed.[45]This proved advantageous to the Soviet troops, who had limited fatalities. Additionally, the secrecy in planning the attacks and misinformation provide to the mujahideen proved to be a successful strategy in organizing ambushes against the resistance forces.[46]
Although the secrecy in planning and execution of war plans went a long way in misinforming the insurgents and, therefore, giving a significant advantage to the Soviet-DRA forces, its execution became its weakness as only one party was privy to the information. [47] The inconsistency in the information between the Soviet and Afghan forces resulted in inept attacks that had bantam effect on the resistance forces. Moreover, the misinformation caused discontent within the military ranks affecting the morale of the military personnel.
In their plans, the Soviets overlooked the mujahideen as worthy opponents. Their initial planning was thus full of misplaced confidence over the quashing of the resistance. This overconfidence became the Soviet’s bane as the war progressed, causing their eventual withdrawal. Further, the Soviet had not taken into account the terrain within which the war would be fought. The Soviet military had conservative training tactics and skills, only effective in Europe. Their equipment was additionally not designed for the mountainous desert terrains.[48]
Contrary to their plans, the Soviet did not consider the uniqueness of the war they were fighting. The forces thus suffered from “the inflexibility of its command structure, from the platoon to the divisional level, and from the limited skills of its conscripts.”[49] Considering the war required light infantry only as well as basic infantry skills, the Soviet had not trained its forces for this, relegating them to using complex military skills that were useless in the type of war they were fighting.[50]
Impact of Soviet Doctrine in the War
The Soviet Doctrine of war involved structured and trained troops. The troops had good training in conventional warfare. Furthermore, “Soviet military doctrine envisioned their employment on flat, rolling terrain like that of Europe. This latter kind of warfare is characterized doctrinally by deep offensive operations carried out by heavy tank-mechanized formations, massed and echeloned to conduct breaches of dense defenses, followed by a rapid advance into the enemy rear to encircle and destroy them.”[51] In addition to the ground attacks, the Soviet doctrine included air attack of the enemy by missiles[52] and long-range artillery, in addition to an organized airborne and air mobile assault.[53] The objective of this dogma is usually a fast conclusive victory over the enemy.
The practicality and the victory expected using the doctrine, however, proved elusive. The environment and the enemy the Soviet army faced rendered the policy impractical. The Soviet army was additionally not prepared for the mujahideen, which proved elusive, adaptable, and difficult to annihilate.[54] The inability to use the doctrine and the resilience of the mujahideen prompted the use of ad hoc counterinsurgency strategies.[55] Further, with no assured victory, the small Soviet forces victories were short-lived owing to the reemergence of the mujahideen in purged areas after some time. Under these circumstances, “the Soviet command shifted its emphasis from military operations to long-term political, social, and economic warfare against the insurgents.[56]”
Effect on Operation Art
The failure of the doctrine of war prompted a change of tact in dealing with the enemy. It is at this point that the Soviet forced opted for joint operations. The combined operations gave them an advantage, as the DRA forces were conversant with the terrain. Moreover, realizing that the bulk of the resistance had Soviet army training from the initial Soviet-Afghan exchange[57], there was need for change in tactics.[58] The change here involved concentration on the cities and key facilities. The concentration also extended to transportation networks.[59] The insurgents’ genocidal razing of villages and the annihilation of the rural economy thus prompted the change in the Soviet’s tact. Towards the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the military’s operation art had evolved into three kinds of operations: “static defense of key centers, securing lines of communications and supply (the so-called “highway war”), and direct operations against the Mujahideen.”[60]
Operational Assessment
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was reminiscent of the Czechoslovak incursion of 1968.[61] Observably the little attention given to eccentric warfare by the Soviet military was evident. Largely, this was from the view that such strategies were counterrevolutionary concepts.[62] In the initial invasion, the military used powerful airborne forces and some of the least trained of the ground forces. The ground forces were third rated Muslims molded in mechanical rifle divisions.[63] The airbases, in contrast, had Soviet-trained forces, based at the Kabul airport. This highlights the primacy given by the Soviet to air superiority in the course of the war.
The sidelining of the DRA forces in its operational planning helps to highlight the little confidence that the Soviet forces had on the Afghan forces.[64] This action had devastating consequence on the joint forces campaign against the insurgents. Nevertheless, far more devastating is the Soviet’s reliance on the doctrine of war, which proved futile against the insurgents. Their lack of creativity and flexibility caused them a lot, including an embarrassment with the eventual withdrawal from DRA without accomplishing their objective.
Lessons Learned
Regarding war, there is need for flexibility in response to the enemy and the environment. This is in addition to caution against overconfidence over the military incapability of the enemy. At the onset of the war, the Soviet regarded the insurgency as a quick fix problem, which only a few of its troops could quash. Even in the absence of victory, the Soviet did not change tact and still brought their heavy artillery to the war. They only discovered too late the ineffectiveness of their artillery, their doctrine, and offensive tactics.[65]
Command structure is a necessary ingredient in any war. Any break in communication with the troop or deviation from the plan should be made known to the troops as fast as possible. The Soviet learned this the hard way in their uncoordinated battles as well as in their misinformation. By giving wrong information to the DRA forces, their campaigns had little impact on the enemy causing discontent among the army ranks as well as the resurgence of the enemy.
Conclusion
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan did not mark the end of the Afghan insurrection; it was only a phase in what became a bloody civil war between the Islamist militant groups. The war was additionally an embarrassment for a superpower, whose military power proved futile over the insurgency that has continued to plague Afghanistan to date. Part of the failure of the Soviet emanated from within its ranks, the uncoordinated approach, and the overreliance on its stringent war doctrine even in the face of a different environment and adaptive enemies. Additionally, the Soviet’s overconfidence did not help the situation, as the war that they had hoped would be a short affair dragged for a decade. Apart from creating refugees into Pakistan, who ironically acted as military reservoirs to the insurgents, the war had consequential effects on the Soviet Union. The tensions between the different countries that formed the Union escalated with the war resulting in the eventual disintegration of the Union. Miscalculations on its part, therefore, cost it a war that despite its military strength, its victory proved elusive. Both internal and external factors, therefore, helped deliver a US-Vietnam style defeat of the Soviet Union.
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Sidky, H. “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001.” Modern Asian Studies 41, (2007): 849-888
Steele, Jonathan. “A tale of two retreats: Afghan transition in historical perspective.” Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (2013): 306-317
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[1] Akhtar Nasreen, “Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban,” International Journal On World Peace 25, no. 4 (2008): 49
[2] Robinson Paul, “Soviet Hearts-and-Minds Operations in Afghanistan,” Historian 72, no. 1 (2010): 1
[3] Sidky H “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” Modern Asian Studies 41, (2007): 849
[4] Ibid, 853
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid, 854
[8] Ibid
[9] Hughes Geraint, “The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview,” Defence Studies, (2008):326
[10] Robinson, 4
[11] Sidky, 854
[12] Ibid
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15] Steele Jonathan, “A tale of two retreats: Afghan transition in historical perspective,” Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (2013): 306
[16] Hughes, 329
[17] Ibid
[18]Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2002): 23
[19] Ibid
[20] Prados John, “Notes on the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan,” The Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (2002): 466
[21] Hughes, 337
[22] Ibid
[23] Kalinovsky Artemy, “Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan,” Journal Of Cold War Studies 11, no. 4 (2009): 46
[24] Lester Grau and Michael Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, (Kansas; University Press of Kansas, 2002), 72
[25] Ibid
[26] Ibid, 73
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid, 75
[29] Ibid, 77
[30] Dibb Paul, “The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: lessons to be learned?,” Australian Journal Of International Affairs 64, no. 5 (2010): 495
[31] Kalinovsky
[32] Scott R. McMichael, “The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War,” Parameters (1989): 21
[33] Ibid
[34] Ibid
[35] Kalinovsky, 51
[36] Ibid
[37] Kalinovsky, 53
[38]Boris, 13
[39] Hughes, 337
[40] Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Washington: Congress Research Service, 2009): 6
[41] Hilali A.Z., “China’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 20, no. 3 (2001): 323
[42] Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union,” Review of International Studies 25, (1999): 694
[43] Ibid
[44] Steve and Catherine, 7
[45] Ibid, 36
[46] Ibid
[47] Ibid, 72
[48] Hughes, 338
[49] Ibid
[50] Ibid
[51] Scott, 21
[52]Scott McMichael, “Soviet Counter-Insurgency Doctrine-An Ideological Blind Spot,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review (1990): 23
[53]McMichael, “Soviet Tactical Performance and Adaptation in Afghanistan,” Journal of Soviet Military Studies 3, no. 1 (1990): 73
[54] Scott, 22
[55] Ibid
[56] Ibid, 24
[57] Ibid
[58] Lester and Michael, 73
[59]I. Tretiak “Organization and Conduct of Offensive Battle in Mountain-Taiga Terrain,” MilitaryHistory Journal, no.7, (1980):42
[60] Scott, 24
[61] Stephen J. Blank, Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 1979-90, (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 1991): 29
[62] Ibid
[63] Joseph Collins, “Soviet military performance in Afghanistan: A preliminary assessment,” Comparative Strategy 4, no. 2 (1983): 148
[64]Mahmut Gareyev, ‘The Afghan Problem: Three Years Without Soviet Troops’, International Affairs
(1992): 17
[65] Stephen 30
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