Title Australia to achieve regional deterrence and regional submarine superiority with conventional submarines

Chapter 2 Literature Review

In order to make a determination in this research paper whether Australia will achieve submarine deterrence and regional superiority, defining and expanding on these aspects of submarine and related theories will be required. Chapter 3 will expand on other related theories and principles to provide further background understanding for the analysis of the topic in Chapter 4. This paper will not be able to research each aspect in detail but simply an overview for the reader to understand what the conclusion was fundamentally based upon.

Defining and expanding on submarine deterrence will be the first area covered followed by submarine superiority. Submarine deterrence and other related material such as Defence Policy and Strategy, region of concern or area of operations and potential threat states for which the deterrence is required.

First of all, the context must be established in order to determine the method of deterrence which is best suited to Australia’s situation. For example, what is the deterrence required for, where is the deterrence required, and what type of deterrence is required? As already has been explained the ADF have stipulated a submarine deterrence is required, but can this be achieved via other means? By setting the context this may be a simpler question to answer.

Deterrence definitions
As defined in the Royal Australian Navy’s Australian Maritime Doctrine, deterrence is prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction [1].

Achen and Snidal define deterrence as a threat designed to stop an action. It necessarily involves an actor sending a clear message: that if an opponent carries out an action, there will be consequences that are intended to outweigh the benefits of the initial action[2].
Decision-makers are said to be rational if they compare the expected costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and, based on the results of that comparison, choose the course of action that maximises benefit or minimises cost according to a consistent, hierarchical value system. 1 In contrast, decision-makers are said to be irrational if, given a choice am ong alternative courses of action, they do not choose behaviour which they believe satisfies their higher priority value or if the choice between alternatives is made by m eans other than by generally accepted logic – for example, if it was based on the toss of a coin. 2
Deterrence need not be a punishment either. Glenn Snyder’s definition of deterrence is: ‘One deters another party from doing something by the implicit or explicit threat of applying some sanction if the forbidden act is performed, or by the promise of a reward if the act is not performed’[3]. Both of these methods may hold true, however the case of deterrence by sanction has more relevance when considering the use of a conventional submarine for protection of a state’s strategic or national assets.

These are both a very simple definitions of deterrence. Achen and Snidal go on to explain a simple version of rational deterrence theory in which it is assumed there are two rational actors, the initiator and the defender. The defender seeks to prevent some action by the initiator. The initiator moves first, either attacking or not. Then the defender chooses whether to engage in war or to capitulate. However, what is not known to the initiator with certainty is the defender’s ability and commitment to fight back after the attack. Suppose, first, that the defender’s threat to retaliate is credible. That is, the initiator believes it likely that the option to retaliate actually exists (the defender has the military means to retaliate after an attack and is politically free to do so), and that the defender would find retaliation in his interest if the prize is threatened. Then, if the initiator is deterrable (the threatened punishment exceeds his gains from attacking), he will see that an attack will make him worse off than restraint. Hence the initiator will not attack. Conversely, if a deterrable initiator believes that it would very likely not be in the defender’s interest to retaliate, or that the defender lacks the means or the will to do so, the initiator will attack. Thus, under conventional rational-choice assumptions, when the attacker is deterrable, successful deterrence turns on the defender’s credibility. If the latter can convince the attacker that he has the political and military ability to fight, and that the prize (or his reputation for fighting when challenged) is worth more to him than the cost of the war, then, and only then, will a deterrable initiator be deterred. [1]

 

“Get 20% OFF on a Similar Assignment!! Place Your Order and Use this Coupon Code: SUPER20”

---

Title Australia to achieve regional deterrence and regional submarine superiority with conventional submarines was first posted on March 27, 2020 at 9:16 am.
©2020 “Buy Custom Essays“. Use of this feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this article in your feed reader, then the site is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact me at ukbestwriting@gmail.com